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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JERRY WEAVER, d.b.a.

REALEX REALTY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
LA\-JRENCE R. HODULA and
LA.JA G. l10DULA,

Case No. 14597

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

P RELHUNARY STATEHENT
The parties will be referred to as they appeared
in the trial court in this brief.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff to obtain his
conunission for the sale of defendants'
attorney's

home and for

fees.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court dismissed the plaintiff's
cause of action and held for defendants on their
counterclaim.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgrrent
against him,

and judgment in his

favor.

STATEHENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Jerry Weaver,
the defendants, Mr. and Hrs.

a realtor,

Lawrence R.

entered into a sales agency contract,

Nodula,

Exhibit III,

in April of 1974 for the sale of defendants'
located in Syraccse,
to pay pla:c--

cc

c_

,-.

Utah,
~ales

home

and the de fen dan ts agreed
commission.

The plaintiff found a buyer, 11r.
Stevens.

and

and /lrs.

Trc1cy

Thereafter, three earnest money agreements,

Exhibits X, XI, and II, were signed by the buyer <1ncl
defendants which finally led to the si,JninCJ of a I<c.Jl
Esta.te Contract, Exhibit I,
August 27, 1974.

consummating the ,;ale· on

The contract provided for l'"''r•rc·nt

2
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of $1,951.95 cash, $440.00 a month payments until
the principal and interest were paid in full, and
the buyer agreed to obtain a loan as soon as pessib le.
Because defendants needed $1,900.00 cash to
enable them to move into a condominium, the plaintiff
delayed receiving part of his conunission to a later
time to help the defendants.
Following the sale, buyer continued to try to
refinance the home to cash out defendants' equity.
Efforts to arrange financing stalled during September,
October and
a

t~ovember

because the economy experienced

recession, hitting a low point around September of

1974.

Home loans became hard to obtain.
On December 11, 1974, the defendants and buyer

signed an agreerrent of accord and sa tis faction whereby
they agreed to rescind their contract.

Plaintiff brought

suit to recover his commission on December 11, 1974, and
the defendants cow1terclaimed.
Plalntiff believes that his commission was earned
and due as of the signlng of the real estate contract on
,\uyust

27,

1974.

Defendants disagree.

3
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The District Court found that the plaintiff
failed to perform the written agreement between the
parties, the plaintiff breached his fiduciary relationship with the defendants and failed to make full disclosure to defendants of all pertinent facts concerning
the loan, and dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action.
The District Court also found that the defendants contributed $286.00 toward the plaintiff's commission plus
$190.00 for a title policy, and that the defendants were
entitled to attorney's fees of $500.00 on the basis of
fairness and equity.
ARGU11ENT
POUlT I
THE PLAINTIFF DID FULFILL HIS OBLIGATION BY
PROVIDhJG A PURCHASER WHO \vAS ABLE TO HAKE
THE $440. ~0 A NO,~TH PAYHENTS A.l'<D WHO WAS
;JUALif~E~ :'') OBTAHl A LOAN, A.l'JD HE PERFOR!1ED
TOTALLY THE \-JRITTE!~ AGREEt!Ei~T BET\vEEi~ THE
PARTIES.

A real estate broker has an obligation to produce a purchaser who is ready, willing and able to
purchase the property at the seller's terms, and to
do so without any dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation which would leave the seller vulnerable
to a loss of his bargain.

See F.f.l.A. Financial
4
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Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d
670 (1965).
The terms agreed to by the seller were first
included in the sales agency contract, Exhibit III.
It states:
During the life of this contract, if you
find a party who is ready, able and willing
to buy, lease or exchange said property or
any part thereof, at said price and terms,
or any other price or terms, to which I may
agree in writing, or if said property or any
part thereof is sold, leased or exchanged
during said term by myself or any other
party, I agree to pay a commission of 6%
of such sale, ...
"I" refers to the property owner, the defendants,

in the above agreement, and "you" refers to

the plaintiff.
The price and terms to which the defendants
agreed in writing were set forth in the Uniform Real
Estate contract, Exhibit I, signed on August 27,
1974, which was the last written agreement signed by
the defendants.

It

states:

3.
Said buyer hereby agrees to enter into
possession and pay for said described
premises the sum of $38,900.00 payable at
the office of seller, his assigns or order
at Security Title Company, Farmington, Utah,
strictly within the following times, to wit:

5
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$1,951.95 cash, the receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged, and the balance of
$36,948.05 shall be paid as follows:
The
sum of $440.00 or more, on or before the
1st day of October, A.D. 1974, and the sum
of $440.00 or more, on or before the 1st
day of each succeeding month thereafter
until interest and principal are paid in
full.
Said payment includes interest,
principal, taxes and fire insurance premi urns, with the taxes and fire insurance
premium to be paid by the seller at the due
date of each and added on to the then contract balance. Buyers hereby agree to
obtain a conventional loan of not to exceed
10% per annum, as soon as possible. Seller
hereby agrees to assume and pay all expenses
necessary and incident in obtaining said
loan.
(emphasis added)
The listing agreement required the plaintiff to
find a ready, willing and able buyer according to the
terms specified by the defendants in writing.

The last

agreement signed by defendants stated that $440.00 v1ould
be paid each month until the balance was paid off, and
that a loan would t•J obtained by the buyer as soon as
possible.

The contract did not state a time before

which a loan had to be obtained.

The District Court

found that $440.00 a month was an exceptionally hi0h
payment which acted as an incentive for the bu:;cr to
obtain the loan.

The plaintiff also test.ified thcl'c 1f

the buyer could not obtain financing, 'chen the dc>fL·n-

6
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dants were willing to continue receiving the large
monthly payments at the reflected rate of interest.
The Utah Supreme Court has helped clarify
the burden that a real estate broker has to carry
out in order to be entitled to his commission in
F.rl.A. Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., supra.
In that case, defendant, Build, Inc., listed an apartment house with Cook Realty Company, agreeing to pay
a 5% commission.

Defendant entered into an earnest

money and exchange agreement to sell the apartment
house, and executed a promissory note and a mortgage
on a duplex as security on the note.

Thereafter, Cook

assigned the note to the plaintiff, payment on the
note was stopped by defendant after four payments, and
plaintiff brought suit.

As a

defense, defendant as-

serted that within sixty days after the sale of the
apartment house the buyers became dissatisfied with
the transaction, abandoned the property, and brought
suit to rescind the purchase contract.

The defendant

alleged that it was a result of certain misrepresentations mCJ.de about the property by Cook Realty.

It

appcCJ.ring to the court that there was no actionable

7
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misrepresentation by Cook Realty, the Supreme Court
held that a real estate broker has an obligation to
produce a purchaser who is ready, willing and able to
purchase property according to the terms of the seller,
and to do so without any dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation.

Once this is done, the court held, a

broker cannot be held to be an insurer against the
possibility that the purchaser may become dissatisfied
and sue to rescind.
In the case at hand, plaintiff produced a buyer
who was ready, willing and able to purchase according
to the terms of the defendants.

On the basis of a

$17,000 a year salary, the buyer was able to make the
$440.00 a month payments which is not disputed, and the
buyer was qualified to obtain a loan as the District
Court found.
On November 8, 1974, 74 days after the sale was
consummated, the defendants notified the buyers that
they had until December 15, 1974, to obtain a loan to
pay off the defendants' equity, because the defendants
had become concerned about the condition of their home,
as evidenced by their at_torney's le'cter, L::-:hibit V,
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dated November 8, 19 74, which stated:
I am also going to advise Realex Realty
of our position, because my clients are
not going to allow their horne to be
wasted by your failure to keep the property up and then have the value of the
horne depreciated.

Since the buyer was not able to obtain financing due to the then existing money situation, the
defendants and buyer subsequently agreed to rescind
the contract on December 11, 1974.
Since the broker cannot be held to be an insurer against the possibility that the buyer will
becorne dissatisfied and sue to rescind, as held in
the F.I1.A.

Financial case, the plaintiff cannot be

an insurer against the possibility that both the
buyer and seller will become dissatisfied and agree
to rescind because of unforeseeable circumstances,
as they have done in the case at hand.
Therefore, the plaintiff performed his part
of the written agreement by obtaining a purchaser
who was ready, willing and able to purchase according
to the written terms of the defendant, and should be
entitled to his commission as long as there was no

9
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dishonesty,

fraud,

or misrepresentation involved.
POINT II

PAROL EVIDENCE IS NOT ADMISSIBLE TO CONTRADICT,
ADD TO, VARY OR SUBTRACT FROM THE TERHS OF A
WRITTEN AGREEMENT, Ai.W THE S UPRE11E COURT
SHOULD DISREGARD THE TESTIMONY OF WITdESSES
SEEKING TO VARY THE TERMS OF AN OTHERI'IISE
UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACT, EVEN IN THE ABSE"CE
OF OBJECTION IN THE LOWER COURT.
Stated in general terms,

parol evidence may not

be given to change the terms of a written agreement
which is clear, definite and unambiguous.

This rule

has been adopted and consistently affirmed in this
state.

See Strout General Realty Agency,

Broderick, 522 P.2d 144

(1974);

2 2 Utah 2 d 2 52 , 2 5 l P . 2 d 7 6 9
The case at
parol or

extri~sic

~and

Inc.

Rainford v.

v.

Rytting,

( 19 6 9 ) .

involves the admission of

~~~dnnce

without objection to

that the written agreement entered into by the

show

p~rties

in April and on the 27th of August did not accurately
reflect the agreement of tf.e parties.
Defendants admit reading and si<Jl1ing the Uniform Real Estate Contract which provides,
under Point I

above.

Nevertheless,

~s

stated

they contend that

the plaintiff and defendants discussed or~lly that tl1c
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buyer was to receive his loan before the plaintiff
was entitled to his corrunission.

Defendants also

testified, on page 13 of the transcript, that they
were assured orally that the loan would go through
within thirtY days in a conversation at the tirre
of signing the real estate contract on August 27,
1974.

The plaintiff testified on page 60, that he

could make no such guarantee and that it could take
up to six months for the loan to go through, and that
the defendants understood this.
The District Court found that the listlng agreerrent called for a dmm payment equivalent to the
defendants' equity, and that the plaintiff in obtaining the earnest money agreement and presumably the
real estate contract, did so on the basis that the
buyer would obtain immediate financing.
The point is that the written agreement did
not state what the defendants' testimony indicated
and what the court found.

The terms were clear.

Plaintiff would find a ready, willing and able buyer
CJt the terms CJgrced in writing.

The real estate

contract provided that the buyer would pay $440.00

11
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a month and that the financing would be obtained
as soon as possible.

The contract did not state

that a loan had to be obtained within thirty days
for the deal to be final, or that the defendants
had to get their equity before the plaintiff was
entitled to his commission.
The courts have been unanimous in applying
the parol evidence rule strictly to those documents
in which the parties have made a distinct and complete writing of their agreement.

In such a case

the authorities are agreed that, in the event of
misunderstanding, the documents shall be taken as
conclusive evidence of their intention.

3 Jones

on Evidence, §16:1 (6th Ed., page 72).
The parol evidence rule prevents other words
from being added to or subtracted from those which
the parties

ha·~·•'

dc<u::-erately set down in writing.

The courts are not at liberty to speculate as to the
subjective intention of the parties, they are charged
with the duty of ascertaining the meaning of the
written language.

They cannot give effect to any in-

tention which is not expressed by the language of the

12 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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instrurrent.

In other words,

if the intent and rreaning

may be ascertained in the language of the writing, i t
must be construed to mean what it says, and other evidence may not be received to give it new meaning.
3 Jones on Evidence, §16:18 (6th Ed., pages 120
through 121).
The Supreme Court was called upon to construe
a written contract between a plaintiff broker and a
defendant seller in Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc.,
v. Broderick, supra.

That case was an appeal from a

judgrrent against the plaintiff in an action to recover
a real estate broker's commission after the defendant
sold his own house.

The defendant persuaded the trial

court that the defendant agreed orally to pay the commission only in the event that the plaintiff, broker,
sold the home,

in spite of the written agreement that

stated that the defendant agreed to pay the commission
if a ready, willing and able buyer was procured by the
plaintiff or anybody else,

including the defendant.

The Surreme Court reversed the trial court and held
that the trial court erred in permitting oral testirnuny to vary the disputed paragraph and in finding
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that the agreement as signed was not the agreement
of the parties.

The court stated that under the

general rule, parol evidence may not be given to
change the term of a written agreement which is clear,
Then the court explained

definite and unambiguous.

that the policy behind this rule is the following:
.•. To permit that would to cast doubt upon
the integrity of all contracts and leave
the party to a solemn agreement at the
mercy of the uncertainties of oral testimony given by one who in the subsequent
light of events discovers that he made
a bad bargain.
~ .. Without that rule there would be no assur-

ance of the enforceability of a written
contract.
If such assurance were removed
today from our law, general disaster would
result, because of the consequent destruction of confidence, for the tremendous but
closely adjusted machinery of modern business cannot function at all without confidence in t~e enforceability of contracts .... '
In the case

a~

bar, the listing agreement

stated that the pla1ntiff was to be paid his commission
if the plaintiff finds a buyer, ready, willing and
able to purchase at the terms agreed in writing. The
real estate contract stated that $440.00 would be paid
each month, until interest and principal arc paid

111

full, and that buyer would obtain a loan as soon as

14
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possible.

By the defendants' oral testimony, they per-

suaded the District Court that the listing agreement
called for the defendants to

receive their equity

before the 6% commission was earned by plaintiff,
and that $440.00 would be paid for one or two months,
and that the buyers would obtain financing immediately,
if not sooner, within thirty days, and that if financing could not be obtained immediately that the contract
was void.

The parol evidence clearly changes the mean-

ing and intention of the unambiguous written agreement.
As

was stated previously, parol evidence was

permitted without objection from

plai~tiff's

attorney.

It is a general rule that an appellate court will consider only such questions as were raised in the lower
court.

However, the rule of waiver by failing to

raise the objection in the trial court to parol evidence objectionable under the parol evidence rule is
not one which has been universally accepted. Some
courts have taken the position that if the terms
of the written contract are free from ambiguity,
the rights of the parties are to be determined and
controlled thereby, without any effect being given

15
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to testimony which would vary or contradict such
terms, even though the testimony is admitted without objection.

92 A.L.R. at 819.

Plaintiff was not able to find any Utah cases
on this point, but many states in our region have
so held.

In Folger v. Purkiser, 127 Cal.App. 554,

16 P.2d 305 (1932), the court held that although
evidence was admitted without objection, of an oral
agreement that the purchase price should be paid
at a certain time, the appellate court must determine
the time of performance without regard to the evidence
of such oral agreement.

It was stated that the parol

evidence rule is not a rule of evidence, but is one of
substantive law, and that the parties have not waived
their right to urge the point on appeal that the evidence should

:_e

d~o;regarded.

In an action by plaintiff for a real estate commission, the Supreme Court of Oregon in Ruff v. Boltz,
448 P.2d 549, 252 Or. 2d 236

(1968), reversed the lower

court decision which ruled in favor of the defendant on
the basis of oral testimony.

The court held:
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The parol evidence rule is the the rule of subst.anti ve law and will be applied whether or
not objection is made to the admission of
the evidence which violates t.he rule.
The rule in Ut.ah should be t.he sarre, because
t.he parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law
and parol evidence should be disregarded, even without. objection in t.he trial court.

Therefore, the

court. should disregard the parol evidence heard in
t.he trial court, since it varies an already unambiguous contract.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY FINDING AND
CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF BREACHED
HIS FIDUCIARY DUTY TO DEFENDANTS BY
FAILING TO DISCLOSE THAT THERE WAS NO
LON< HONEY AVAILABLE TO PURCHASER.
<£nerally in actions by and against brokers t.he
burden of proof is cast upon the party who asserts t.he
affirmative of an issue raised by the pleading.
~~.Jur.2d

12

§248, page 989.

Thus, in Martineau v. Hansen, 47 Utah 549,
155 P. 432

(1916), the Ut.ah Suprerre Court held that

one employing a broker to find a purchaser of land
has 'che burden of proving that. false representations

17
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were made by the broker as to the financial ability
of the prospective purchaser.

Hartineau involved

an action by the plaintiff, broker, against the defendant, seller, to recover judgment on a promissory
note made by the defendant to plaintiff for a $1,750.00
commission.

The defendant raised the affirmative

defense that false representations were made concerning the financial ability of the purchaser for the
purpose of inducing the plaintiff to enter into the
contract of sale and for the purpose of obtaining
the commission evidenced by the note. The court stated:
It seems to us that, in view that the
law preswnes solvency and never presumes
fraud or deceit, and in view that if a
principal relies upon the defense of
having been deceived by the broker with
regard to the purchaser's financial ability
to pay, he must allege the facts in that
regard in his ;>~eading, there fore he should
also be re:Fll ,.~c} 1:0 assume the burden of
proof to establLsh the facts thus pleaded.
To that effect, as we read the decisions,
is the weight of authority. We are of the
opinion, therefore, that the burden of proof
rested upon the defendant to prove the
financial inability of Mr. Earl to pay, as
well as to prove the fraud or bad faith
charged against plaintiff.
Thus, the defendants herein had the burden
of proving that plaintiff failed to disclose material

18
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in formation to the defendants before they signed
the real estate contract dated August 27, 1974.
This defendants did not do.
The only evidence presented to the District
Court concerning the plaintiff's knowledge at the
tirre of signing the August 27, 19 74, contract was,
first, the testimony of Paula Sorenson, the loan
officer from Zions First National Bank.

She testi-

fied on page 88 of the transcript that the buyer,
Mr. Stevens, was qualified for a loan, but when he
applied for a loan in July or August of 1974 there
were no conventional loan money available through
her bank.

However, she testified that she couldn't

say what the situation was at other loan institutions.
On page 96 of the transcript, in answer to
a question by counsel on whether there were signs
of money being available for the Stevens' loan in
light of the situation in Zions First National Bank

whc re there absolutely was no money available, plaintiff testified as follows:
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Q:

Mr. Weaver, even though there was no money
available for the Stevens' loan in
August, were there other institutions
that gave you indication that there may
be funds available?

A:

Yes, there certainly was.
This was the
only lender that said, you know, "we are
not making any loans".
But other lenders
were.
In fact, I wouldn't have been continuing to go to other places and taking
my time and Mr. Stevens' time and Mr.
Modula's, if I hadn't have thought there
was some hope of obtaining a loan.

On page 65 of the transcript, plaintiff testified that he had taken the buyer to eight or ten
different loan institutions and made applications
at several of them.

He said that they would make

application and were led to believe that the institutions believed that they were going to be able to
make the loan, and then would later turn it down.
All this

n==~rred

after the August 27, 1974,

sale was consummated.
The only evidence that the defendants presented
the court was their testimony on page 94 of the transcript, which was that plaintiff had never told them
that no money was available.

This is true, because the

plaintiff did not know that there was no monel' a val 1 ,1blc.
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The summary of all of this testimony would
indicate that the defendants were not aware that
money was not available at the time the August 27,
1974, contract was signed.

The extent of the plain-

tiff's knowledge was that some loan institutions
were not making loans, and that is far short of
knowledge that no money was available.

This evidence

does not satisfy the defendants' burden of proving
that plaintiff withheld material information.
Furthermore, the defendants acknowledged that
they were aware of the difficulty with loans at the
time of signing the second and third earnest money
agreements on August 10 and 17, 1974, on page 32 of
the transcript.
It follows that they were also aware of the
problem at the time of the signing of the real estate
contract dated August 27, 1974.

They were aware of

what information the plaintiff had obtained1 that
there was difficulty in getting a loan.

That is why

the terms of the contract stated that the loan would
be obtained as soon as possible instead of within a
definite period of time, and why large monthly pay-
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ments of $440.00 would be made.
The defendants did not carry their burden
of proving that material information concerning the
buyer's loan was withheld according to the evidence.
Therefore, the plaintiff did not breach his fiduciary
duty.
POINT IV
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY GRANTING
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO DEFENDANTS.
The District Court awarded the defendants
$500.00 attorney's fees,

stating that because the

plaintiff had insisted on attorney's fees under
the signed listing agreement, fairness and equity
required the provision to work -both ways.
improper.
ney' s

This was

The rule is well established that at tor-

::ees s'-.:::Juld not be awarded in the abscn ce of

stat.utL

~r

a

j~0e:-··ten

t

between the parties.

In the sa(es agency contract signed by the
defendants, the fifth clause states:
In case
enforce
I agree
and all

of the employment of an attorney to
any of the terms of this agreL>mcnt,
to pay a reasonable attorney's fee
costs of collection.

As stated previously, the lilllguage in thL>
listing agreement makes it clear that ttw rJVJnvr of
22
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the property, the defendants, are giving the plaintiff authorization to take certain action necessary
to sell the home.

Therefore, the "I" in the above

clause refers to the property owner, or defendants.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Hawkins v. Perry,
123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372

(1953), held that in the

absence of statute or agreement between the parties,
a litigant cannot be awarded attorney's fees.

In that

case, plaintiff gave money to his uncle to be used in
purchasing a house, with the understanding that title
would be taken in the uncle's name until plaintiff
became of age, at which time it would be turned over
to the plaintiff.

Plaintiff had to file suit to re-

cover the property and was awarded attorney's fees by
the trial court, but the Supreme Court reversed, based
on the holding above.
In the case at hand, there was a writ ten agreement by the parties, but the terms of the ag:eement
limited the awarding of attorney's fees to the plaintiff.
In Holland v. Brown, 15 Utah 2d 422, 394 P.2d
77 (1969), this court stated that the plaintiff's
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rights to attorney's fees must be found,

if at all,

That case involved

in the terms of the contract.

a suit to enforce the written contract to purchase
cookware for $279.00 and for attorney's fees.

The

lower court awarded the plaintiff nominal damages
and $75.00 attorney's fees.

The Supreme Court re-

versed the awarding of attorney's fees because the
provision in the contract stated that in the case
of repossession of merchandise, attorney's fees and
court costs would be paid.

The Supreme Court held

that because there was no delivery of the merchandise,
there could be no repossession, and hence the terms
of the contract had no application.
Likewise, in the case at hand the contract
limited payment of attornej's fees to plaintiff by
the owner, and the plaintiff made no promise at all
to pay attorney's fees.
The trial court based

it~

awarding of attor-

ney's fees on equity and fairness.

This has no

support in the cases, and in fact the Utah cases
suggest quite the contrary.
In Carlson v.
P.2d 989

Hamilton,

8 Utah 2d 272, 332

(1958), this court stated that people shuuld

24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

be able to contract on their own terms without indulgence of paternalism by courts in alleviation
of one side or another from effects of a bad contract.

That case involved a suit by a purchaser

under a real estate contract for money paid to defendant sellers which the purchaser breached. The
court stated that it is only where it turns out
that one side or the other is to be penalized by
en forcerrent of a contract so unconscionable that
no fair-minded person would view the result without
profound sense of injustice that equity will step
in.

The court held that where the sales price was

$22,000.00 and the plaintiff had paid $6,680.00, it
was not unconscionable for a defendant to keep the
full $6,680.00 as liquidated damaged under the forte1ture provision of the contract.
In our case, only the defendants promised to
pay attorney's fees if it became necessary to collect
plaintiff's commission.

The plaintiff did not pro-

nuse to pay attorney's fees in the event he lost the
suit to collect his commission, or if the defendants
brought suit.

Once the terms are agreed upon, it
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should not be rewritten as the District Court has
done to relieve a partY from its burden unless it
is so unjust and so unconscionable as to provoke
a profound sense of injustice.

Under no circum-

stances do the cases suggest that the contract should
be rewritten to impose a burden on a party.
Plaintiff's suit is not a frivolous claim
nor one brought to harass the defendants.

It is

a reasonable, forthright claim for a commission on
a sale involving a great deal of tirre and effort.
The defendants'

agreement and promise to pay attor-

ney's fees falls far short from being unjust and
unconscionable so as to allow equity to step in and
rewrite the contract.

to include whatever
for their own

;-"-,~'~,:,

The parties should be free

~rovisions

-:'c_lon

1

they feel necessary

and after two parties have

agreed and signed a wri t'cen agreement the court
should not be allowed to step in and impose a burden
on a party as the District Court has done.
Therefore

1

there being no promise by the pL:lin-

tiff to pay attorney's fees nor any statute \vh 1ch
would allow it, the plaintiff should be relievccd from
paying the defendants' attorney's fees.
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CONCLUSION
The plaintiff's obligation should be considered
fulfilled because he found a ready, willing and able
buyer according to the written terms of the defendants.
Parol evidence admitted by the District Court without
objection should be disregarded, since it adds to and
changes the meaning of an already unambiguous and comp le te writ ten con tract.
The defendants failed to carry their burden of
proving that the plaintiff withheld pertinent inforrrr
ation concerning the buyers obtaining a loan and,
there fore, there was no breach of a fiduciary duty.
Attorney's fees are not awardable in the absence
of a statute or agreement, and equity should not rewrite
an agreement to place a burden on the plaintiff under
the facts of this case.
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of July,
19 76.
STAt\lLEY M.

SMEDLEY

Attorney for Plaintiff
Jerry Weaver
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